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Abstract. This paper develops a new STIT based deontic logic, pessimistic util-
itarian deontic logic, capable of analyzing the miners puzzle. The key idea of the
semantics of this logic is: one set of possible worlds is better than another set of
possible worlds iff the worst world in the first set is better than the worst world
in the second. This semantics gives an idea to write predictions in the miners
scenario meanwhile blocks the unwilling statement.
1 Introduction
This paper develops a new STIT based deontic logic, referring it as pessimistic utilitar-
ian deontic logic, capable of analyzing a recently popular puzzle in deontic logic, the
miners puzzle [9]. The miners puzzle goes like this:
Ten miners are trapped either in shaft A or in shaft B, but we do not know
which one. Water threatens to flood the shafts. We only have enough sandbags
to block one shaft but not both. If one shaft is blocked, all of the water will go
into the other shaft, killing every miner if they are inside. If we block neither
shaft, both will be partially flooded, killing one miner.
Lacking any information about the miners’ exact whereabouts, it seems acceptable to
say that:
(1) We ought to block neither shaft.
However, we also accept that
(2) If the miners are in shaft A, we ought to block shaft A.
(3) If the miners are in shaft B, we ought to block shaft B.
But we also know that
(4) Either the miners are in shaft A or they are in shaft B.
And (2)-(4) seem to entail
(5) Either we ought to block shaft A or we ought to block shaft B.
Which contradicts (1).
It is stated by Willer [16], any adequate semantics of dyadic deontic modality must
offer a solution to the miners puzzle. The existing STIT-based deontic logic [7, 11, 14]
does not offer a satisfying analysis to this puzzle: although the deduction from (2)-(4)
to (5) is blocked by the dyadic deontic operator defined in Sun [14], but both Horty [7]
and Sun [14] are unable to predict (1). In this paper our motivation is to develop a new
STIT-based deontic logic which is capable of blocking the deduction from (2)-(4) to (5)
and it is able to predict (1)-(4).
In STIT-based deontic logic, agents make choices. The outcome of agents’ choice is
represented by a set of possible worlds. A preference relation over the set of all possible
worlds is given as primitive. This preference relation is then lifted to the relation of
preference over sets of possible worlds. A choice is better than another iff the resulting
set of worlds of the first choice is better than the resulting set of worlds of the second.
A proposition ϕ is obligatory (we ought to see to it that ϕ) iff it is ensured by every best
choice, i.e., it is true in every world of every best choice.
Therefore the interpretation of deontic modality is based on best choices, which can
only be defined on top of preference over sets of worlds, which is defined by lifting
from the preference over worlds. There is no standard way of lifting preference. Lang
and van der Torre [13] discuss the following three ways of lifting:
– strong lifting For two sets of worlds W1 and W2, W1 is strongly better than W2
iff ∀w ∈ W1, ∀v ∈ W2, w is better than v. That is, the worst world in W1 is better
than the best world in W2.
– optimistic lifting W1 is optimistically better than W2 iff ∃w ∈W1, ∀v ∈W2, w is
better than v. That is, the best world in W1 is better than the best world in W2.
– pessimistic lifting W1 pessimistically better than W2 iff ∀w ∈W1, ∃v ∈W2, w is
better than v. That is, the worst world in W1 is better than the worst world in W2.
In Horty [7], Kooi and Tamminga [11] and Sun [14] the strong lifting is adopted.
Applying the strong lifting to the miners scenario, all the three choices block neither,
block A and block B are best. “we ought to block neither” is then not true in the miners
scenario in the logic Horty [7], Kooi and Tamminga [11] and Sun [14].
In this paper we use pessimistic lifting instead of strong lifting. There is a single
best choice block neither according to pessimistic lifting. Therefore “we ought to block
neither” is true. It can be further proved that both (2) and (3) are true while the deduction
from (2)-(4) to (5) is not valid. Therefore our logic offers a satisfying solution to the
miners paradox.
The structure of this paper is as following: in Section 2 we review the existing
solutions to the miners puzzle. Then in Section 3 we review the existing STIT-based
deontic logic. In Section 4 we develop the pessimistic utilitarian deontic logic and offer
a viable solution to the miners puzzle. Section 5 is our conclusion and future work.
2 Solutions of the miners paradox
Several authors have provided different solutions to solve the miners puzzle. Among
them, we summarize the following approaches:
Kolodny and MacFarlane [9] give a detailed discussion of various escape routes.
Then they conclude that the only possible solution to the puzzle is to invalidate the
argument from (2) to (5). To do this, Kolodny and MacFarlane state we have three
choices: rejecting modus ponens (MP), rejecting disjunction introduction (∨I), reject-
ing disjunction elimination (∨E). Among these three Kolodny and MacFarlane further
demonstrate that the only wise choice is to reject MP.
Willer [16] developed a fourth option to invalidate the argument form (2) to (5):
falsify the monotonicity. In his solution the modus ponens can be preserved (there are
very good reasons to do so) and we are unable to derive the inconsistency.
Charlow [5] proposes a comprehensive solution which requires rethinking the rela-
tionship between relevant information (what we know) and practical rankings of possi-
bilities and actions (what to do).
Cariani et al [3] argues that the traditional Kratzer’s semantics [12] of deontic con-
ditionals is not capable of solving the puzzle. They propose to extend the standard
Kratzer’s account by adding a parameter representing a “decision problem” to solve the
puzzle. The “decision problem” shares some similarity to STIT operator with single
agent.
Carr [4] argues that the proposal of Cariani et al is still problematic. To develop
a satisfying semantics, Carr uses three parameters to define deontic modality: an in-
formational parameter, a value parameter and a decision rule parameter. According to
Carr’s proposal, (1) to (3) are all correct predictions and no contradiction arise within
her framework.
Gabbay et al [6] offers a solution to the miners puzzle using idea from intuitionistic
logic. In their logic “or” is interpreted in an intuitionistic favour. Then the reasoning
from statement (2) to (5) is blocked.
3 STIT-based deontic logic
In this section we review STIT-based deontic logic. Following Horty [7], we call such
logic utilitarian deontic logic (UDL).
3.1 Language
The language of the UDL is built from a finite set Agent of agents and a countable set
P of propositional letters. We will use p, q as variables for atomic propositions in P ,
and use G, with G ⊆ Agent, as a group of agents. The utilitarian deontic language L
is given by the following Backus-Naur Form:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ©Gϕ | ©G(ϕ/ϕ)
Intuitively,©Gϕ is read as “G ought to see to it that ϕ”.©G(ϕ/ψ) is read as “G
ought to see to it that ϕ under the condition ψ”.
Our language is simpler than the language of Horty [7] in the sense that we omit the
possibility operator ♦ and we represent the ought operator in a more compact way than
Horty [7].
3.2 Semantics
The semantics of utilitarian deontic logic is based on the utilitarian frames, which is a
simplification of STIT frame of Horty [7].
Definition 1 (Utilitarian frame). A utilitarian frame is a tuple 〈W,A, Choice,≤〉,
where W is a nonempty set of possible worlds, A is a finite set of agents, Choice is
a choice function, and ≤, represents the preference of the group A, is a reflexive and
transitive relation on W .
The choice function Choice is a function from the power set of A to the power
set of the power set of W , i.e. Choice : ℘(A) 7→ ℘(℘(W )). Choice is built from the
individual choice function IndChoice: A 7→ ℘(℘(W )). The IndChoice must satisfy
the following three conditions:
(1) for each i ∈ A it holds that IndChoice(i) is a partition of W ;
(2) let A = {1, ..., n}, for every x1 ∈ IndChoice(1), . . . , xn ∈ IndChoice(n), x1 ∩
. . . ∩ xn 6= ∅;
We call a function s: A 7→ ℘(W ) a selection function if for each i ∈ A, s(i) ∈
IndChoice(i). Let Selection be the set of all selection functions, for any G ⊆ A, if
G 6= ∅, we define Choice(G) = {⋂i∈G s(i) : s ∈ Selection}. If G = ∅, we define
Choice(G) = {W}. Here our utilitarian frame simplifies STIT frame in the sense that
we restrict STIT frame to a single moment, therefore the concept of history in STIT
frame is omitted.
Having defined utilitarian frames, we are ready to define preferences over sets of
possible worlds.
Definition 2 (preferences over sets of worlds via strong lifting [14]). Let X,Y ⊆W
be two sets of worlds from a utilitarian frame. Then X s Y (Y is weakly preferred
to X) if and only if
(1) for each w ∈ X , for each w′ ∈ Y , w ≤ w′ and
(2) there exists some v ∈ X , some v′ ∈ Y , v ≤ v′.
X ≺s Y (Y is strongly preferred to X) if and only if X s Y and it is not the case
that Y s X .
Definition 3 (dominance relation [7]). Let F be a utilitarian frame. Let G ⊆ A and
K, K ′ ∈ Choice(G). Then
K sG K ′ iff for all S ∈ Choice(A−G), K ∩ S s K ′ ∩ S.
K sG K ′ is read as “K ′ weakly dominates K”. From a decision theoretical per-
spective, K sG K ′ means that no matter how other agents act, the outcome of choos-
ing K ′ is no worse than that of choosing K. We use K ≺sG K ′ as an abbreviation
of K sG K ′ but K ′ sG K does not hold. If K ≺sG K ′, we then say K ′ strongly
dominate K.
Definition 4 (restricted choice sets [7]). Let G be groups of agents from a utilitarian
frame and X a set of worlds in the frame. Then
Choice(G/X) = {K : K ∈ Choice(G) and K ∩X 6= ∅}
Intuitively, Choice(G/X) is the collection of those choices of group G that are
consistent with condition X .
We now define a conditional dominance relation over agent’s choice. The intuition
is: to compare whether the agent’s choiceK is dominated byK ′ under the conditionX ,
we only need to consider other agents’ choices which are consistent with the condition
X and at least one of K and K ′.
Definition 5 (conditional dominance [14]). Let G be groups of agents from a utilitar-
ian frame and X a set of worlds in the frame. Let K, K ′ ∈ Choice(G/X). Then
K sG/X K ′ iff for all S ∈ Choice((A−G)/(X ∩ (K ∪K ′))), K ∩X ∩ S s
K ′ ∩X ∩ S.
K sG/X K ′ is read as “K ′ weakly dominates K under the condition of X”. And
we will use K ≺sG/X K ′, read as “K ′ strongly dominates K under the condition of
X”, to express K sG/X K ′ and it is not the case that K ′ sG/X K.
Definition 6 (Optimal and conditional optimal [7]). Let G be a group of agents from
a utilitarian frame,
– OptimalsG = {K ∈ Choice(G) : there is no K ′ ∈ Choice(G) such that K ≺sG
K ′}.
– OptimalsG/X = {K ∈ Choice(G/X) : there’s no K ′ ∈ Choice(G/X) such that
K ≺sG/X K ′}.
As in traditional modal logic, a model is a frame plus a valuation.
Definition 7 (utilitarian model). A utilitarian model M is an ordered pair 〈F , V 〉
where F is a utilitarian frame and V a valuation that assigns to each atomic propo-
sition p ∈ P a set of worlds V (p) ⊆W .
In the semantic of UDL, the optimal choices and conditional optimal choices are
used to interpret the deontic operators.
Definition 8 (truth conditions). LetM =< F, V > be a utilitarian model. Letw ∈W
and let ϕ,ψ ∈ L. Then
(1) M,w |= p iff w ∈V(p);
(2) M,w |= ¬ϕ iff it is not the case that M,w |= ϕ;
(3) M,w |= ϕ ∧ ψ iff M,w |= ϕ and M,w |= ψ;
(4) M,w |=©Gϕ iff K ⊆ ||ϕ|| for each K ∈ OptimalsG;
(5) M,w |=©G(ϕ/ψ) iff K ⊆ ||ϕ|| for each K ∈ OptimalsG/ψ .
Here ‖ϕ‖ = {w ∈W : M,w |= ϕ}.
We say ϕ is true in the world w of a utilitarian model M if M,w |= ϕ. Just like
in the standard modal logic (for instance, Blackburn [1]), we introduce the concept of
validity as follows: a formula ϕ is valid (|= ϕ) if it is true at every world of every
utilitarian model.
4 Pessimistic utilitarian deontic logic
For pessimistic utilitarian deontic logic, instead of strong lifting, we using pessimistic
lifting.
Definition 9 (preferences over sets of worlds via pessimistic lifting). Let X,Y ⊆W
be two sets of worlds from a utilitarian frame. Then X p Y if and only if there exists
w ∈ X , such that for all w′ ∈ Y , w ≤ w′. X ≺p Y if and only if X p Y and it is not
the case that Y p X .
Proposition 1. Let X and Y be sets of worlds from a utilitarian frame. Then:
1. If X p Y and Y p Z, then X p Z.
2. If X p Y and Y ≺p Z, then X ≺p Z.
3. If X ≺p Y and Y p Z, then X ≺p Z.
Proof. Here we prove the first two items, the third case is similar.
1. Assume X p Y and Y p Z, then ther exist u ∈ X such that for all v ∈ Y ,
u ≤ v. There exist v′ ∈ Y such that for all w ∈ Z, v′ ≤ w. Then we have u ≤ v′.
For an arbitrary w′ ∈ Z, we have v′ ≤ w′. Therefore u ≤ w′.
2. Assume X p Y and Y ≺p Z. From item 1. we know X p Z. To prove it is not
the case that Z p X , we assume otherwise. Then from Z p X and X p Y we
deduce Z p Y , contradicts to Y ≺p Z. 
Proposition 1 states that the relation of preference over sets of worlds via pessimistic
lifting is transitive. It is worth knowing that this proposition is crucial. Only with tran-
sitivity, we can properly define the concept of dominance and optimality. Another point
we need to pay attention here is although we use the symble p, normally we don’t
have X p X when X is not a singleton.
The definition of dominance (pG), conditional dominance (pG/X ), optimal (OptimalpG)
and conditional optimal (OptimalpG/X ) in the pessimistic setting are obtained by sim-
ply changing ≤s to ≤p of their strong version counterpart.
Proposition 2. Let G be groups of agents from a utilitarian frame, and let K, K ′,
K ′′ ∈ Choice(G). Then:
1. If K pG K ′ and K ′ pG K ′′, then K pG K ′′.
2. If K pG K ′ and K ′ ≺pG K ′′, then K ≺pG K ′′.
3. If K ≺pG K ′ and K ′ pG K ′′, then K ≺pG K ′′.
Proof. Here we prove the first two cases. The third case is similar.
1. Assume K pG K ′ and K ′ pG K ′′, then for all S ∈ Choice(A − G), K ∩ S p
K ′ ∩ S, K ′ ∩ S p K ′′ ∩ S. Then by Proposition 1 we have K ∩ S p K ′′ ∩ S.
Hence K pG K ′′.
2. Similar to the proof of item 2 of Proposition 1. 
Proposition 3. Let G be a group of agents from a utilitarian frame and X a set of
worlds in the frame. Let K, K ′, K ′′ ∈ Choice(G/X). Then the following holds,
1. If K G/X K ′ and K ′ G/X K ′′, then K G/X K ′′.
2. If K G/X K ′ and K ′ ≺G/X K ′′, then K ≺G/X K ′′.
3. If K ≺G/X K ′ and K ′ G/X K ′′, then K ≺G/X K ′′.
Proof. See Proposition 12 of Sun [14].
Proposition 4. O(A/B) ∧ O(A/C) → O(A/(B ∨ C)) is not valid in pessimistic
utilitarian deontic logic.
Proof. It’s sufficient to construct a counter-example. Let M = (W,Agent, Choice,≤
, V ),W = {w1, . . . , w6},Agent = {1, 2},Choice({1}) = {{w1, w2}, {w,3 , w4}, {w5, w6}},
Choice({2}) = {W}. w3 ≤ w4 ≤ w1 ≤ w2 ≤ w5 ≤ w6. V (p) = {w1, w2},
V (q) = {w1, w3, w5}. It can be verified that M is a utilitarian model. Moreover, we
have M,w |=©(p/q) ∧©(p/¬q) but M,w 2©(p/(q ∨ ¬q)).
4.1 Application: an analysis of the miners puzzle
The miners puzzle can be represented by the following figure:
(10)w5
(0)w6
in B
in B
in B
(0)
(9)w1
w3
in A
in A
in A
(10)
(9)w2
w4
block neither
block B
block A
Figure 4.1: W = {w1, . . . , w6}, w3 ≈ w6 ≤ w1 ≈ w2 ≤ w4 ≈ w5.
We assume nature and rescuer are the only two agents involved in this scenario. We
further assume nature has only one dummy choice the outcome of which is the set of
all possible worlds. The rescuer has three choices: block neither, block A and block B.
According to the pessimistic semantics, block neither is the only dominated choice. For
each choice there are two outcomes. Therefore in total there are six possible worlds. The
preference of worlds are determined by the number of miners saved in that world. Then
according to the pessimistic semantics, block neither is the only optimal choice. So we
can draw the prediction that “the rescuer ought to block neither”. Moreover, given the
condition of miners being in A, block A becomes the only conditional optimal choice.
Hence we have “if the miners are in A, then the rescuer ought to block A”. The case for
miners being in B are similar. Although we have both “if the miners are in A, then the
rescuer ought to block A” and “if the miners are in B, then the rescuer ought to block
B”, by Proposition 4 we can avoid the prediction that “the rescuer ought to block either
A or B”. Therefore the pessimistic utilitarian deontic logic gives a viable solution to
the miners puzzle.
Compared to those approaches reviewed in Section 2, our STIT based approach has
stronger expressive power. We have agents and action modality in our language. This
gives considerable expressive power already. Just like Horty [7] and Broersen [2], our
framework can easily be extended to involve temporal modality, which further increase
the expressive power.
5 Conclusion and future work
This paper develops a new STIT based deontic logic, pessimistic utilitarian deontic
logic, capable of analyzing the miners puzzle. The key idea of the semantics of this
logic is: one set of possible worlds is better another set of possible worlds iff the worst
world in the first set is better than the worst world in the second. This semantics gives
write predictions in the miners scenario meanwhile blocks the problematic prediction.
Concerning future works, an axiomatisation of pessimistic utilitarian deontic logic
is worthy investigating. A second potential extension is to use other STIT operators, for
example the deliberative STIT [8] and X-STIT [2].
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